Many animals show multiple patterns of parental care, where more than one of the four basic patterns (biparental care, uniparental care by males or females, or no care) is present within a single population during a single breeding season. We consider three reasons for the existence of multiple patterns of parental care: (1) mixed-strategy behaviours; (2) time-dependent behaviour with parents changing their care decision during the breeding season; and (3) quality differences between individuals leading to different care decisions being made depending on the qualities of both parents. The basic framework we use to investigate these is a two-stage game-theoretical model, and we highlight the importance of including feedback between the parental care decisions made by population members and the probability that a deserting individual will find a new mate. Including this feedback may introduce a nonlinear dependence of the fitness payoffs on the frequencies with which the pure strategies ('care' and 'desert') are played by each of the sexes. This can have important consequences for the existence of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs). For example, mixed-strategy ESSs may exist (an outcome forbidden if the feedback is not included) and, in one model, the feedback also prevents uniparental care by either sex from being evolutionarily stable. We also point out that decisions made by animals without dependent offspring can have important consequences for observed parental care behaviour.
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Different species have different patterns of parental care, ranging from no care at all, through uniparental care by males or females, to biparental care (Gross & Sargent 1985; Clutton-Brock 1991; Clutton-Brock & Godfray 1991; Székely et al. 1996) . Some species show multiple patterns of care, where more than one of these basic patterns is present within a single population during a single breeding season. Such behaviour can be observed, for example, in penduline tits, Remiz pendulinus, Kentish plover, Charadrius alexandrinus, and St Peter's fish, Maynard Smith (1977) proposed that parental care decisions should be understood as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), that is, a pair of strategies such that neither sex would benefit from changing its strategy given the behaviour of the other. He developed a simple game-theoretical model ('model 2') to elucidate the conditions under which each of the four basic patterns of care (biparental care, uniparental care by males, uniparental care by females, or no care) might be favoured. Although Maynard Smith's model has been very influential, it cannot explain multiple patterns of care. There are three obvious ways in which multiple patterns of parental care might appear. First, the ESS may consist of mixedstrategy behaviours, that is, either or both of the parents should desert with a probability between one and zero. Second, behaviour may be time dependent with parents changing their care decision during the breeding season. Third, there may be differences in quality between individuals leading to different care decisions being made depending on the qualities of both parents. In Maynard Smith's 'model 2': (1) there are no mixed ESS solutions since an individual's behaviour can depend on its sex, and the payoffs for care and desertion are fixed (Selten 1980; Maynard Smith 1982, page 107) ; (2) it describes a single, time-independent decision; and (3) the individuals in the population are identical. While it is true that some parameter values lead to two possible alternative ESSs, these are evolutionary rather than simultaneous alternatives (Maynard Smith 1982) .
Other game-theoretical models of parental care have been discussed (Maynard Smith 1977; Grafen & Sibly 1978; Lazarus 1990; Yamamura & Tsuji 1993; BalshineEarn & Earn 1997) . Lazarus (1990) considered a uniform population and dealt explicitly with only one breeding attempt. The other models (Maynard Smith 1977, model 
